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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This presentation is based upon the handling of claims that arose
from a contract entered into in 1977 between Sylvania Technical Sys-
tems, Inc. and the Imperial Government of Iran. Under the contract,
Sylvania, a subsidiary of GTE Corporation, promised to train several
hundred Iranian Air Force personnel to manage, maintain, and operate
an electronic intelligence-gathering system over a forty month period,
and Iran promised to pay Sylvania approximately fifty-seven million dol-
lars. The contract was almost fifty percent complete at the time of the
Iranian revolution in February of 1979. The new government refused to
continue performance under the contract and to pay Sylvania for the
work it performed and the expense of winding down the contract. In-
stead, the new government complained that Sylvania had not performed
its obligations. These disputes had not been resolved by the time the
American hostages were seized by Iran in November of 1979, at which
time President Carter promptly froze all Iranian assets in this country.
Sylvania instituted litigation against Iran in California state court in
the spring of 1980. Sylvania sought to prevent Iran from collecting on
standby letters of credit provided to Iran in connection with the contract
and to collect damages for Iran's breach of the contract. While that liti-
gation was pending, the United States and Iran reached an agreement for
the release of the hostages. Under that agreement, the frozen Iranian
assets were to be returned to Iran, with one billion dollars set aside to
satisfy claims of American citizens against Iran. The agreement also pro-
vided for the creation of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to be
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composed of three United States representatives, three Iranian represent-
atives, and three representatives from neutral countries. The tribunal
was to sit at The Hague and resolve the claims. Sylvania filed its claim
with the Tribunal in December of 1981. It was finally heard in February
of 1985 and resulted in an award in favor of Sylvania in the approximate
amount of $12.5 million. The Tribunal also determined that the standby
letters of credit provided by Sylvania to the Iranians were to be cancelled.
Sylvania was paid within a week and has recently received confirmation
that Iran has cancelled the letters of credit.
II. MANAGING THE CLAIMS PROCESS
One subject of this symposium is risk insurance. After listening to
the other speakers today, I ask myself whether we should have acquired
such insurance. Had we to do it again, under the same circumstances,
with the political risks, would insurance make sense? At the time of the
revolution, of course, Sylvania had to stop work; it had employees in Iran
and could not predict what was going to happen. Therefore, Sylvania
simply stopped its operations in Iran and sent the Iranian students it was
training in the United States back to Iran. The Iranians owed Sylvania
approximately $7.5 million, and letters of credit which guaranteed repay-
ment of advance payments and performance were outstanding in the
amount of approximately $14.5 million. All the new Iranian government
had to do to receive money on those letters of credit was to request it.
Sylvania also believed that if it could not continue to perform, the
Ayatollah and his people would accuse Sylvania of breaching the con-
tract. In fact, that is precisely what they did.
From an in-house counsel point of view, managing an international
claim is similar to managing any domestic litigation. In-house counsel
must decide whether the probable recovery will be greater than the effort
of pursuing it, and then they select outside counsel and support them
with evidence and the company's resources. Sylvania found that there is,
nevertheless, a difference in the international process because of the polit-
ical risks involved.
Sylvania's Iranian claim illustrates both this similarity and differ-
ence. As a result of the Iranian Revolution, Sylvania found itself in mid-
performance of an Iranian government contract that could not be com-
pleted and for which no payments would be received. It attempted, un-
successfully, to resolve its claim by negotiation. It then pursued
litigation in the United States, and ultimately recovered through the Tri-
bunal. The Tribunal, which held its hearing on the claim and Iran's
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counterclaim six years after the State of Iran passed into the control of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, rendered an award in Sylvania's favor last
June.
Sylvania had agreed under the contract to train Iranian Air Force
personnel to operate and maintain electronic equipment. Sylvania per-
formed training services in the United States and in Iran. Although Syl-
vania had been receiving progress payments, it had already spent $7.5
million and were subject to standby letters of credit in the amount of
about $14.5 million. In fact, Iran did attempt to claim that total amount
in May 1980 under a letter of credit provision that required only a de-
mand with no other showing.
In pursuing its remedies, Sylvania's first objective was to bar any
payment on the letters of credit. It also wanted, of course, to be paid the
amount that Iran owed it under the contract. The third goal was to de-
fend against any Iranian counterclaim; such a claim was later asserted in
the amount of forty million dollars.
Given the uncertainties of jurisdiction over Iran in the United States
and the adverse precedents under letter of credit law, Sylvania found it
difficult to assess the probability of success on any of these objectives.
The probability was certainly greater than zero. It was clear that Sylva-
nia could seek an injunction against the use of the letter of credit. Once
that decision was made, it was only another small step to seek recovery
of the amounts owed to us.
Like many corporations, Sylvania rarely uses in-house counsel for
litigation. Sylvania initially evaluated this matter to be primarily an in-
ternational documentary credit instruments problem and, therefore, re-
tained the same international practice firm which was representing
another Sylvania subsidiary in seeking a similar injunction. In addition
to that firm, Sylvania asked Harlan Richter of the firm of Pillsbury,
Madison & Sutro, to be litigation counsel on its behalf in the California
court. It was Sylvania's subsequent good fortune that Mr. Richter then
became its lead counsel in the proceedings before the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. In addition, Sylvania retained a Dutch lawyer so that
its team could utilize his expertise in international arbitration and his
familiarity with aspects of the Tribunal's proceedings.
This article will demonstrate that the management of an interna-
tional claim is a matter of optimizing the close cooperation indispensable
in a complex factual and legal setting.
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III. ANTICIPATING RISKS
When Sylvania negotiated its contract in 1977, it was concerned
mainly with anticipating risks and avoiding them. Because there was ex-
tensive competition for the contracts, however, Sylvania had little bar-
gaining power. It did not help that the Iranians had drafted the contract
in Farsi and subsequently translated the terms into English.
Sylvania obtained a fifteen percent down payment on the purchase
price of the contract. The contract contemplated progress payments over
the life of the contract so that it would not be at risk for a large unpaid
amount of services. The progress payments were funded by a letter of
credit from an American bank. The weakness of this protection, how-
ever, was that the contract required repayment of the downpayment to
be secured by Sylvania's standby letter of credit. This weakness allowed
the Iranians to recover the down payment upon demand. In addition,
the Iranians adopted an arbitrary procedure for determining the extent of
the progress under the contract, which, by the time of the revolution, had
caused a substantial underpayment to Sylvania for the work performed.
The contract provided for termination at will by the Iranians and
defined the rights of the parties in the event of such termination or of
force majeure. Ultimately, those provisions were relied on by the Tribu-
nal to fix the amount of recovery by Sylvania so that the provisions pro-
vided Sylvania with a measure of protection. It took Sylvania, however,
six years to recover its losses.
The Iranians insisted on a clause in the contract that provided for
performance disputes under the contract be resolved under Iranian law
and in Iranian courts. They were able to compel inclusion of this provi-
sion because of their stronger bargaining power. This provision, of
course, raised serious risks. Sylvania's knowledge of Iranian law was
limited, and therefore it did not know whether its rights would be pro-
tected. In addition, Sylvania had no experience in Iranian courts which
would lead it to believe that it would receive a fair hearing if opposed by
the Iranian government.
These choice of law and venue provisions were troublesome before
the hostages were seized by the Iranians but thereafter American courts
had little trouble in concluding that American companies could not have
a fair hearing Iran. Therefore, American courts retained jurisdiction of
cases against the Iranian government.
As mentioned earlier, the downpayment received from the Iranian
government was secured by a standby letter of credit. A second standby
letter of credit also guaranteed contract performance by Sylvania. Under
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both letters of credit, Sylvania was initially at risk for an amount in ex-
cess of sixteen million dollars. At any time, Iran could make a call on
those letters of credit, and Sylvania would have been obligated to seek
recovery from Iran if it contended that the call was improper. This risk,
of course, was recognized at the time of the negotiations, but it could not
be avoided because of Iran's superior bargaining power.
IV. ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES BY
NEGOTIATION
It came as no surprise that the political aspect of our claim was as
much a factor in the negotiations as in the litigation. The new govern-
ment gave personal expression to its policy that oil revenues must be
spent on the new programs of the Islamic Republic instead of being di-
verted to pay the obligations of the hated Imperial Government.
For the first several months the Islamic Republic government failed
to respond to Sylvania's requests for discussions. In August 1979, Sylva-
nia was invited, as were many other claimants, to meet with Iran's repre-
sentatives in Tehran for negotiations. Apparently, the Iranian
negotiators only settled with claimants who were holding goods which
the new government wanted. Nothing concerning Sylvania was resolved.
In March 1982, after the Tribunal had been established and the claim
filed, Iran invited the Sylvania representatives to negotiation meetings in
Vienna. They met with them several times during a single week for a
total of seven or eight hours. No results were achieved, although the
Iranians did hint that Sylvania could keep the money already paid by the
Shah's government if Sylvania withdrew its claim-a zero-zero settle-
ment. They then met twice at The Hague. First, following the prehear-
ing conference, Iran offered Sylvania an amiable settlement if it would
pay Iran a certain amount and withdraw its claim. At the second negoti-
ation one week before the hearing, Iran would not budge from their un-
acceptable zero-zero settlement position.
There were two main features to the Iran-Sylvania discussions.
First, Iran wished to preserve an appearance of willingness to negotiate,
perhaps to the Tribunal. Second, there would be no deal unless Sylvania
could deliver something desirable to the successor government which
was worth the amount Iran would have to pay. Another GTE subsidiary
did, in fact, negotiate a very large settlement because it held telecommu-
nications switches which Iran needed.
1986]
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V. LITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA COURTS
The litigation against Iran in California was instituted to prevent
payment to Iran under the letters of credit. Sylvania was not alone in
seeking protection against payments under letters of credit during the
time between the fall of the Shah's government and the seizure of the
hostages; a large number of American companies was involved in similar
actions. In those cases, the American banks which had issued the letters
of credit vigorously resisted injunctive relief because of their concern that
the international community would lose confidence in the commitments
made by those banks. The banks' position, and that of many of the
courts, was that the only purpose of a standby letter of credit is to shift
the immediate impact of a loss to the person who provided the letter.
The courts were very sympathetic to the banks' position prior to the
seizure of the hostages.
In KMW International v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. I the court
held that:
When KMW entered into its contract with the Water and Power Au-
thority it assumed the business risks of international transactions.
These risks included the possibility that even if a dispute about per-
formance of the underlying contract should arise and international liti-
gation ensue, which we assume can occur in this case, KMW's funds
would be paid out under the irrevocable letter of credit and held in
foreign hands. A preliminary injunction shifts the burden to Chase to
pursue that international litigation. Such a shifting of risk is unwar-
ranted where, as here, one party to an international business transac-
tion has previously subjected itself to the risks and hazards of foreign
political turmoil. 2
Of course, the picture changed drastically once the hostages were
seized. Sylvania did not bring its action in California until after the
seizure. By then, the courts began to realize that the American compa-
nies had no effective remedy against Iran and, therefore, granted injunc-
tive relief against payment under the letters of credit.3
There are jurisdictional problems in bringing an action against a for-
eign government. The right to bring suit in the United States either can
be governed by treaty, here the Treaty of Amity, Economic Rights and
1. 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979).
2. Id. at 15.
3. Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1356-57 (1 1th
Cir. 1982); Rockwell International Systems, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583, 586 (2d Cir.
1983).
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Consular Rights between the United States and Iran,4 or by statute, in
this case the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.' Both permitted juris-
diction in the United States over Iran if Iran engaged in a commercial
activity which had an impact in the United States. Given the training of
Iranians in the United States, this contract clearly had an impact here.
There were, however, difficulties in gaining jurisdiction over the Iranian
Bank which held the letters of credit. That issue was not resolved before
the case was stayed and the litigation was transferred to the Tribunal.
Service of process was also a problem. Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act,6 the usual mode of service is to go through the United
States State Department and diplomatic channels. After the seizure of
the hostages, however, there were no effective diplomatic channels avail-
able. Sylvania hired a French attorney to go into Iran with copies of the
summons and complaint and to deliver them to the agencies of the Ira-
nian government involved. When the issue came before him, United
States District Court Judge Robert Peckham decided that appropriate
service had been made in this manner.7
The contract provided that any differences between the parties that
resulted from the interpretation of the contract or the execution of the
contract which could not be settled out-of-court must be settled in ac-
cordance with the rules and laws of Iran; thus differences were to be
referred to Iranian courts. After the seizure of the hostages, American
companies did not have access to the Iranian courts. Therefore, Ameri-
can courts accepted jurisdiction. However, a situation such as this one,
in which the courts designated by the contract are so clearly unavailable,
is so rare that the possibility of an American court accepting jurisdiction
based on unavailability should not even be considered in assessing the
risks of most contracts.
VI. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
The Algerian Accords' stayed all litigation, created the Tribunal,
and compelled litigators to submit their disputes to the Tribunal. The
4. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United
States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
6. Id. § 1608 (1982).
7. Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. State of Iran, No. 80-2192 RFP, (N.D. Cal. Oct.
1, 1980)(order approving service of process).
8. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated Jan. 19, 1981 [hereinafter Declaration];
Exec. Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 38 (1981).
1986]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
Sylvania action, like the others, was stayed pending a decision by the
Tribunal. Sylvania had a jurisdictional question at the Tribunal because
the Algerian Accords provided that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over
claims "arising under a binding contract between the parties specifically
providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdic-
tion of the competent Iranian courts."9 The clause sounded uncomforta-
bly close to what Sylvania's contract with Iran provided. In a claim by
Ford Aerospace, however, the Tribunal decided that the quoted clause of
the Accords did not exclude jurisdiction of a claimant when the contract
contained the same language as that in Sylvania's contract.10 That provi-
sion was limited to disputes arising from contract interpretation or per-
formance." The Tribunal decided that issues other than interpretation
and performance were raised by the claim, and since all issues were not
reserved to the Iranian courts, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to resolve all
issues. The Iranians were incensed at this interpretation of the contract
and the Accords.
A comment on the hearing itself is helpful. The parties met in a
house in a residential section of The Hague. The hearing room, which
was much smaller and less formal than a United States courtroom,-
contained a horseshoe-shaped table. The three members of the Tribunal
sat at the head of the table. Sylvania was located on one side and the
Iranians were located on the other. There were simultaneous transla-
tions of the proceedings in English, Farsi, and French. The President of
the Tribunal, Karl Heinz Bockspiegel, allowed equal time to both sides
over the two-day period allotted to the case. The Tribunal was reluctant
to hear live testimony and preferred to have the case submitted on affida-
vits and documents. Although Sylvania had several witnesses with them,
they did not use them, and the presentation at the hearing consisted al-
most exclusively of argument by the attorneys.
The proceedings were very civilized. Twice a day, morning and af-
ternoon, there was a break. Carts containing coffee, tea, and fruit juices
were brought, and everyone-litigants, members of the Tribunal, staff,
and witnesses- would mingle and chat informally. It was clear that the
Tribunal expected the parties to treat each other cordially and with
respect.
President Bockspiegel's predecessor was Gunnar Lagergren, a
9. See Declaration, supra note 8, art. II § 1.
10. See Ford Aerospace & Communications v. Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
(Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Case no. 159), Interlocutory Order No. CTL 6-159, Nov.
5, 1982, Iranian Asset Litigation Reporter at 5620.
11. Id.
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highly respected authority in international arbitration. President Lager-
gren had the reputation of being a diplomat, and he was so diplomatic
that he never pushed the Iranians to do anything. The Iranians tried
every procedural tactic they could think of to delay the proceedings, and
if they asked for a delay, the President would grant it. Even when a
default was ordered against the Iranians, the President excused it, based
on the Iranians alleged unavailability of staff to handle their large case
load.
Although Sylvania was set for hearing three times before the case
was actually heard, others were even less fortunate than Sylvania. Many
claimants who fied at the same time as Sylvania still have not had a
hearing before the Tribunal. In retrospect, Sylvania did relatively well
before the Tribunal. It received a reasonable award, but in American
industry, operating results are judged by what happened this particular
year. This year's profits and losses are most important; next year's finan-
cial results are not as important. Many other claimants before the Tribu-
nal are still faced with several more years of proceedings. American
businesses will be somewhat less than enthusiastic about resolving claims
through the Tribunal process with such delays. Sylvania did not recover
everything it requested; it did not recover its lost future profits, all the
interest it felt appropriate, and all of its litigation costs.
Syvlania achieved a reasonable award through the Tribunal process.
The question remains whether the company could have achieved the
same results if it had purchased a political risk insurance policy. This
question was presented to a symposium audience composed of prominent
practioners in the political risk insurance area. Several practitioners fa-
vored risk insurance coverage in Sylvania's situation. Sylvania and its
counsel, however, continue to hold open minds regarding this question.
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